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Welfare and Work Sanctions:




Sanctions are a key tool for enforcing welfare reform’s work requirements, but little
attention has been paid to how laws, administrative procedures, judicial decisions, and
worker discretion interact in the application of sanctions on the front lines. This study
analyzes administrative fair hearing decisions and in-depth interviews with sanctioned
recipients. The findings suggest that workers interpret and apply sanction rules narrowly,
failing to distinguish procedural violations from substantive ones. It also finds that workers
are skeptical about claims of good cause exceptions from work rule violations, are strict
in the application of the rules governing such exceptions, and overlook rules requiring
them to show that a client’s action (or inaction) was willful before imposing sanctions.
Sanctions are applied across various groups of clients, including those engaged in ongoing
work activities, as well as those who are disadvantaged and less willing to work.
Declining caseloads and increased work among recipients have led many
scholars and policy makers to herald welfare reform as a success (Rector
and Youssef 1999; O’Neill and Hill 2003; U.S. Senate 2003; Haskins
2006). This success frequently is attributed to policies that propel re-
cipients quickly and forcibly into the labor market (Rector and Youssef
1999; O’Neill and Hill 2003; U.S. Senate 2003; Haskins 2006). In welfare
reform, employment services approaches that emphasize training and
education are replaced by aggressive interventions that require recipi-
ents to seek and accept any job or lose their benefits. Sanctions, which
are financial penalties for violating welfare’s rules, provide welfare case-
workers with a powerful tool for ensuring compliance. Scholars consider
the sanctions along with more positive incentives, such as supports and
work-related services, to be responsible for welfare reform’s perceived
success (Rector and Youssef 1999; Mead 2001).
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However, little attention has been paid to how sanctions are applied
on the front lines (Pavetti, Derr, and Hesketh 2003). Rather, research
tends to focus on sanction rates, characteristics of sanctioned families,
and the long-term effect of sanctions on families’ well-being (Born,
Caudill, and Cordero 1999; Fein and Lee 1999; Edelhoch, Liu, and
Martin 2000; Koralek 2000; Westra and Routley 2000; Mancuso and
Lindler 2001; Polit, London, and Martinez 2001; Cherlin et al. 2002;
Kalil, Seefeldt, and Wang 2002; Hasenfeld, Ghose, and Larson 2004;
Pavetti et al. 2004; Wu et al. 2006). For information on sanction policies
and procedures, the few implementation studies rely largely on data
from administrators, from frontline workers, and to lesser extent, from
clients (Fraker et al. 1997; U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services 1999; Pavetti et al. 2004). These studies do not fully capture
the complex mix of rules, administrative procedures, and worker dis-
cretion involved in the application of sanctions.
The current study uses a triangulated research design. The design
combines a content analysis of administrative fair hearing decisions on
welfare sanctions from a suburban county located in New York with in-
depth qualitative interviews of sanctioned recipients, as well as with a
review of the laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative
directives involving sanctions. Laws and administrative procedures pro-
vide structure and guidance for sanction decisions, describing what
should happen during the sanctioning process. Fair hearing decisions,
which are the product of administrative proceedings initiated by clients
to challenge negative agency actions, provide a detailed and individu-
alized administrative account of what occurs from the perspectives of
both recipients and workers. Recipient interviews provide a less struc-
tured and less bureaucratically confined version of similar events. To-
gether, these data shed light on how laws, administrative procedures,
and workers’ discretion interact in the application of sanctions.
Background and Context
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 (U.S. Public Law 104-193) requires the use of sanctions to
address noncompliance with a number of welfare rules, but states have
the option of imposing partial or full-family sanctions. Under a partial
sanction regime, only a portion of the recipient’s welfare grant is re-
duced when an adult member violates a work rule. Under a full-family
sanction regime, the entire family loses its grant for such a violation.
The majority of states (36) impose some form of full-family sanction,
eliminating the welfare grant to the entire family, including children,
either immediately or gradually. Fourteen states, including the two states
with the largest populations of welfare recipients (California and New
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York), impose partial sanctions, which eliminate only the noncompliant
adult’s portion of the grant (Pavetti et al. 2003).
One purpose of sanctions is to encourage compliance with work rules.
They are part of what Lawrence Mead (1997, 24) calls the “help and
hassle” prescription for influencing recipients’ work behaviors. By re-
quiring recipients to engage in work activities, under threat of financial
penalties if they do not, self-sufficiency is encouraged rather than de-
pendency. Although welfare reform legitimizes hassle by requiring sanc-
tions, the welfare system has also been reconfigured to help recipients
to become self-sufficient. Staff responsibilities have been restructured
and new relationships forged with outside service providers, such as
workforce boards or labor departments, which are knowledgeable about
the labor market (Martinson and Holcomb 2002). Local service offices
still make basic eligibility determinations, but they also are encouraged
to function more like job centers than like welfare agencies (Lurie
2006). Welfare reform emphasizes (and provides funding for) support
services, such as child care and transportation. Many programs use the
social work or case management model, which emphasizes flexibility
and personalized services (Segal, Gerdes, and Steiner 2004).
Under such a model, one might reasonably presume that sanctions
are applied flexibly and that workers consider the client’s work behavior
in making individualized and holistic evaluations. Supports and sanc-
tions also presumably are balanced; the latter imposed only on clients
unwilling to participate in work activities. Both before and since welfare
reform, however, scholars have noted that welfare bureaucracies are
often more apt to process paper than to process people. Thomas Kane
and Mary Jo Bane (1994, 7) coin the term “eligibility-compliance cul-
ture” to describe bureaucracies in which workers focus on procedural
rules and paperwork rather than on the helping relationship. Before
welfare reform, program efforts to encourage work demonstrated that
eligibility-compliance cultures are hard to uproot. In her study of the
Job Opportunities and Basic Skills program ( JOBS), Evelyn Brodkin
(1997) finds that agency-performance incentives, including work quotas
and federal reimbursement rates, constrain workers’ choices. These in-
centives also encourage workers to ignore clients’ preferences and
needs. Similarly, Yeheskel Hasenfeld (2000) finds that JOBS workers
institutionalize moral assumptions and stereotypes in their daily inter-
actions with clients, choosing to treat clients with suspicion and distrust.
He also notes that workers use “highly routinized and bureaucratized”
service technologies to assess clients and monitor compliance with work
rules (Hasenfeld 2000, 333).
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF) ush-
ered in sweeping organizational and other reforms, but the resistance
to change persisted, especially among frontline workers (Meyers, Glaser,
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and MacDonald 1998; Meyers and Dillon 1999; Sandfort 2000; Lurie
and Riccucci 2003; Riccucci et al. 2004). In a study that included 11
welfare sites in four states, welfare workers are found to resist organi-
zational reforms that emphasize work-based goals, instead focusing on
traditional eligibly determinations (Riccucci et al. 2004; see also Lurie
and Riccucci 2003). Workers report that the implementation of TANF
changed their jobs little, except for increasing their paperwork. These
findings suggest that work-based goals do not replace but are grafted
onto preexisting eligibility-compliance cultures. Similarly, Jodi Sandfort
(2000) finds that eligibility-compliance practices even surface among
some (but not all) private welfare-to-work contractors. For example, one
program created elaborate tools for monitoring attendance at classroom
sessions, requiring clients to sit and do nothing if classroom sessions
ended early or clients completed assigned tasks.
Sanctions are similarly susceptible to routine or resistant practices.
Workers verify compliance with work rules, as they do eligibility, often
by completing standardized forms and asking clients to provide docu-
ments. Clients typically sign written contracts in which they agree to
engage in work activities and to be monitored through reports that
track, for example, attendance at work programs and Department of
Labor (DOL) appointments to help them look for work. Highly scripted
encounters may occur within tight administrative rule structures. As a
result, sanctions may be less an evaluative task than a clerical one. For
example, sanctions may be applied automatically, as in New York City’s
welfare bureaucracy, where computer systems are programmed to re-
cord sanctions automatically if clients do not appear at a work activity.
Discretion may also play a role in how sanctions are applied. As schol-
ars argue, even the most rule bound of bureaucracies provide oppor-
tunities for discretion, both positive and negative (Mashaw 1971; Han-
dler 1986; Brodkin 1997; Fording, Soss, and Schram 2007). Particularly
in bureaucracies with limited resources, workers may engage in cream-
ing, or helping those they think will succeed while treating harshly those
clients they deem to be troublesome (Lipsky 1980). In the context of
sanctions, such practices might mean that workers ignore technical vi-
olations, for example, a single missed meeting, if the client is perceived
as cooperative. Workers may readily accept such clients’ reasons for not
complying, demanding only minimal proof. In contrast, sanctions may
be applied differently among harder-to-serve clients, typically those with
multiple problems and barriers to work. Workers may be more skeptical
of their explanations and demand higher levels of proof.
There is some indication that harsh treatment from workers correlates
with client disadvantage. Studies show that sanctioned recipients are
younger, have more children, and are more likely to have never married
than are other recipients (Fein and Lee 1999; Edelhoch et al. 2000;
Koralek 2000; Westra and Routley 2000; Mancuso and Lindler 2001;
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Cherlin et al. 2002; Kalil et al. 2002; Hasenfeld et al. 2004; Pavetti et
al. 2004). Sanctioned recipients are also more likely than other recip-
ients to have health problems, including alcohol and drug problems,
and to experience domestic violence (Mancuso and Lindler 2001; Polit
et al. 2001; Cherlin et al. 2002; Kalil et al. 2002; Pavetti et al. 2004).
Compared with clients who are not sanctioned, sanctioned clients have
less human capital. Research also suggests that sanctioned welfare re-
cipients have lower levels of education, less work experience, and longer
periods of time on public assistance (Born et al. 1999; Fein and Lee
1999; Edelhoch et al. 2000; Koralek 2000; Westra and Routley 2000;
Mancuso and Lindler 2001; Cherlin et al. 2002; Kalil et al. 2002; Has-
enfeld et al. 2004; Pavetti et al. 2004; Wu et al. 2006). Logistical prob-
lems, such as securing transportation or child care, are also more fre-
quent among sanctioned recipients than among nonsanctioned ones
(Mancuso and Lindler 2001; Cherlin et al. 2002; Kalil et al. 2002; Has-
enfeld et al. 2004; Pavetti et al. 2004).
These problems and disadvantages are difficult for workers to resolve
because the issues are intractable, but progress is also impeded because
workers lack necessary resources and skills (Meyers et al. 1998). Sanc-
tions may create a disincentive for helping the hardest-to-serve clients;
workers can more easily issue a sanction than provide a support (Bell
2005). In other words, sanctions support the implicit message that fail-
ure stems from a client’s unwillingness to work, not from an agency
that is not helping.
Alternatively, workers may exercise negative discretion broadly, choos-
ing to apply work rules stringently to most or all clients, with little or
no attempt to distinguish the unwilling from the unable or the technical
violation from a more serious infraction. Enforcement of technical vi-
olations (e.g., client failure to notify the correct worker or agency if a
work activity is missed) may substitute for more nuanced assessments.
In short, local offices may create the welfare-to-work version of an eli-
gibility-compliance culture. In a recent study (Lens 2006) of the imple-
mentation of sanctions in Texas, the author finds that transactions be-
tween clients and workers are routinized and mechanical. The findings
suggest that workers fail to assess clients’ work behaviors fully.
In sum, sanctions may be applied in several different ways. They may
be issued in a standardized and highly scripted way that is determined
by adherence to predetermined administrative rule structures. This may
include applying sanction rules more narrowly than the law requires.
Or sanctions may be applied more flexibly; workers may make individ-
ualized assessments that include an evaluation of clients’ work behaviors
over time and place. Finally, workers may also pick and choose among
clients, letting cooperative clients who violate work rules off the hook
while more readily sanctioning troublesome clients. Understanding
workers’ choices requires an in-depth analysis of sanction laws, admin-
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istrative rules, and procedures, as well as an examination of how such
rules and procedures are applied in individual cases.
Data and Method
The front lines of the welfare system can be studied in several different
ways. A common approach is to view “administration from the inside
out” (Brodkin 1997, 6) by observing how workers do their jobs. Another
approach is to look from the outside in, interviewing clients about how
workers handle their cases. The current study incorporates elements of
both approaches, using administrative fair hearing data, generated from
within the bureaucracy, to observe worker behavior indirectly. It also
relies on data from interviews conducted with clients in a suburban
welfare office in Suffolk County, NY. Further, laws, regulations, judicial
decisions, and administrative directives are analyzed to examine the legal
and administrative structure for imposing sanctions.
As noted above, fair hearings are adversarial administrative proceed-
ings initiated by clients to challenge negative agency actions, including
sanctions. A detailed record emerges from the adversarial process, which
includes dictates involving the presentation of evidence by the recipient
and agency, cross-examination of witnesses, and issuance of a written
decision in which the hearing officer summarizes each side’s position,
reports findings of fact, and applies relevant provisions of the law.
Hearings also provide the researcher with an administrative perspec-
tive that differs from the one gained through site observations and from
that obtained in retrospective reporting on interviews or surveys of local
actors (e.g., agency staff, administrators, and clients). Hearings capture,
without any interference from a researcher, the actions of the parties
most interested and involved in the transaction. Thus, they reflect what
people did, not what they report doing, recall having done, may do, or
may not do if under observation. Hearings also provide a rare oppor-
tunity to examine the same case from the perspective of both the worker
and the client; they provide a he-said, she-said narrative absent from
other administrative data.
As legal proceedings, hearings also provide a record, including the
types of required documents, of the bureaucracy’s administrative pro-
cesses. Hearings thus reveal the practicalities and details of implemen-
tation. Documents are a bureaucracy’s central concern, but some bu-
reaucracies are more demanding than others. As Hasenfeld (2000)
notes, bureaucracies serving clients of low social status, such as welfare
recipients, frequently use harsh service technologies and treat clients
with suspicion. Such bureaucracies are likely to disbelieve clients’ rea-
sons for not complying with work rules and to require high levels of
proof. Scholars note that bureaucracies characterized by eligibility-com-
pliance practices are particularly likely to make excessive and rigid de-
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mands for documents (Brodkin 1986; Kane and Bane 1994). Hearings
contain a detailed record of the types and level of proof required. They
thus can reveal the service technologies being used and may enable the
researcher to recognize the existence of eligibility-compliance and other
practices.
In addition, hearings articulate the bureaucracy’s view of how the law
should be interpreted and applied. Similar to judicial decisions, hearing
decisions resolve individual cases by interpreting and applying laws.
Thus, like judicial decisions, hearings can enable the researcher to un-
derstand particular laws and their application. Because hearings are part
of the state welfare bureaucracy, hearing decisions are official pro-
nouncements by the bureaucracy about the bureaucracy.1 The decisions,
although subject to reversal by courts, are fertile sources for information
on how the members of a bureaucracy think and operate at a particular
point in time.
One potential limitation of this data source is the fact that cases in
the hearing process are not generally representative of New York’s wel-
fare cases; few clients appeal.2 Researchers demonstrate in other con-
texts that most people do not complain about official’s actions, but the
complaints of the few who do typically are representative of the mass
of unvoiced complaints (Hyman, Shingler, and Miller 1992).3 Even a small
number of hearings can serve as an indicator for error in bureaucracy
(Altman, Bardo, and Furst 1979). Even if not wholly representative, such
complaints highlight areas of contention within the bureaucracy, provid-
ing a more complex understanding of frontline interactions. The research
value of hearings thus stems not only from the number of cases considered
but also from their purpose and function within the bureaucracy.
The fair hearing data are supplemented here with data from inter-
views of clients who were sanctioned. Half of these participants report-
edly did not appeal their sanctions. The perspective of welfare clients
is similar to that of consumers providing feedback about a business, and
recipients’ perspective differs from that represented in administrative
accounts. Recipients view the agency from the outside, and they often
have a broader and more detailed knowledge of their circumstances
than does their overworked and underresourced worker. They can pro-
vide a thicker and more detailed description of client-worker interac-
tions than can be captured in administrative records.
Respondents were identified through purposive sampling.4 They were
referred to me by a nonprofit agency that contracts with the county
Department of Social Services (DSS) to assist sanctioned clients in Suf-
folk County who fail to respond to their sanction by complying with the
work rules. In addition, I obtained respondent referrals from several
social service agencies in Suffolk County. These organizations include
a legal services organization and a nonprofit agency that provides homes
for homeless families. Recruitment flyers were also distributed at other
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social service agencies, including nonprofit organizations that run wel-
fare-to-work programs and others that provide crisis intervention ser-
vices. To increase the proportion of disadvantaged clients in the sample,
I recruited respondents from agencies that provide crisis and homeless
services. Finally, participants recruited family and friends.
A total of 28 respondents were interviewed in the spring of 2005.
Interviews were conducted using a semistructured interview question-
naire. In-depth interviews allow a deep exploration of respondents’
sanctioning experience and overall work behavior. The interviews also
maximize personal interaction, encouraging familiarity and trust that
enhance the validity of the findings (Berg 1998). To ensure respon-
dents’ privacy and confidentiality, and to create a more relaxed en-
vironment conducive to in-depth interviewing, all but two of the re-
spondents were interviewed in their homes. Two respondents were
interviewed in the offices of a nonprofit organization. Interviews lasted
a little more than an hour, and respondents were paid $25. All but one
of the respondents agreed to allow the interview to be tape-recorded.
Respondents were asked a series of open-ended questions on their
general experiences with the welfare office, prior and present work
experience, and experiences and perceptions of work rules and sanc-
tions. Each interview (except the one that was not recorded) was tran-
scribed verbatim.
The interview sample is a mix of short- and long-term clients. Thirteen
clients (46 percent of the sample) report that they have been on welfare
for 2 years or less, and 15 (53 percent) report receiving assistance for
more than 2 years. The interview sample is split by race as follows: 42
percent are black, 46 percent are white, and 14 percent are Hispanic.
All but three sample members are female. In general, the interview
sample is more educated than the overall welfare population; 48 percent
of all welfare recipients in the national sample have a high school di-
ploma or general equivalency diploma (GED), but 54 percent in the
interview sample fall into this category (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services n.d.; see table 1 for sample characteristics).5 Eleven
percent have some postsecondary education.
I also analyzed laws, regulations, administrative directives, and court
decisions to understand the legal and administrative structure that gov-
erns work rules and sanctions. Judicial cases are included for two rea-
sons. First, court decisions (and especially the appellate court decisions
used here) are official and binding sources for how laws should be
interpreted and applied. Laws and regulations provide only a partial
picture of the law; the judiciary clarifies and interprets broad or vague
statutory language. Second, through their review of state administrative
hearing decisions, courts determine what errors, if any, administrative
agencies have made in the application of laws.6 They are thus a useful
source for exploring how the bureaucracy operates.











Black 39 42 15 36
White 34 46 69 27
Hispanic 22 14 15 6
Education:
Less than high school diploma or GED 46 36 31 40
High school diploma or GED 48 54 46 60
Postsecondary education … 11 23 0
Average age (years) 31 35 33 36
Note.—GED p general equivalency diploma. Results are presented in percentages
unless otherwise specified. All percentages are rounded. All but three sample members
are female.
* National characteristics are drawn from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (n.d.).
In sum, multiple data sources, including administrative records, client
interviews, and official legal and administrative documents are used to
explore the application of sanctions. This use of multiple data sources,
referred to as triangulation, enhances the reliability of the findings (Pad-
gett 1998).
In total, 127 fair hearing decisions are analyzed. This represents all
decisions on work rule violations in Suffolk County in 2002 and 2004.
The decisions are examined using content analysis. First, the following
data were extracted verbatim from each decision and copied onto a
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet: nature of work rule violation, agency’s
description of violation, client’s reason for not complying, and hearing
officer’s decision and rationale. Cases were grouped according to clients’
reasons for noncompliance. The following categories were used: medical
or other exemption, lack of notice of appointment date, family obstacles
or situational challenges, administrative error, and scheduling conflicts
with work or school. This type of “topical survey,” or “manifest content
analysis,” Margarete Sandelowski and Julie Barroso (2003, 911) explain,
“remain[s] close to those data as given” with little or no interpretation.
Each decision was also subjected to what Sandelowski and Barroso
(2003, 912) describe as a “thematic survey.” This method draws on em-
pirical and theoretical literature to conduct an analysis that is interpre-
tative and thematic. The analyses “convey an underlying or more latent
pattern or repetition discerned in the data” (2003, 912) than a topical
survey does. Specifically, the decisions were examined for certain or-
ganizational forms and practices related to the research questions.
Coding identifies interpretative and thematic patterns in data from
the hearing decisions (Miles and Huberman 1994). Provisional codes
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were initially developed by reading through several decisions. Data are
coded on two levels. The first level identifies descriptive codes, and the
second level identifies thematic ones. Some examples of descriptive
codes include “lacking documentation” and “counting the number of
required hours worked.” Examples of focused thematic codes include
“high proof,” “negative discretion,” and “rigid rule adherence.” The
high proof code refers to instances in which clients’ statements were
considered insufficient or dubious and third-party documentary evi-
dence was required. The negative discretion code identifies instances
in which determination of noncompliance was based on a narrow in-
terpretation of the rules. The rigid rule adherence code is a more re-
fined example of negative discretion. It is defined as close adherence
by workers, administrators, or hearing officers to the work rules, irre-
spective of a client’s overall work effort or the underlying work obstacles
he or she faced.
The thematic survey approach was also used to analyze the interview
data. This stage of the analysis relied on HyperResearch, a computer
software program designed for the analysis of qualitative data. Once
again, two levels of codes were used. In the first level, interview tran-
scripts were examined, and a descriptive code was assigned to each line
of data. One descriptive code is “making mistakes.” It was used if clients
described mistakes or misunderstandings related to sanction rules. In
the second level, focused coding was used to examine the line codes
assigned in level 1, identifying how often each code was used, assessing
the importance of each line code, and choosing the codes that best
categorized the emerging themes and patterns (Charmaz 2006). “Bu-
reaucratic skepticism” is an example of a focused code that identifies
situations in which the client reports a subjective belief or experience
that the agency does not believe. Coding was an iterative process, in
which the researcher returned to previously coded transcripts to con-
firm, refute, or modify codes as they developed.
Traditional legal research methods of case law and statutory analysis
are employed to analyze laws, regulations, and court decisions on sanc-
tions. Relevant court decisions on sanctions were identified through
LexisNexis, a searchable electronic database of court decisions and other
legal documents.
Findings
Legal and Administrative Structure
In accordance with federal and state law, recipients of public assistance
in Suffolk County, NY, are required to engage in work activities. Possible
work activities include regular appointments at the New York State DOL,
job search activities and job fairs, some educational opportunities and
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training (e.g., GED classes), and the Suffolk Work Experience Program
(SWEP). In SWEP, clients who do not find employment are required
to work off their grant by performing such tasks as cleaning roads or
parks or working at nonprofit and government agencies.
Failure to comply with the work rules results in the imposition of a
sanction, which is a pro rata reduction of the violator’s portion of the
grant (New York Social Services Law, sec. 342 [2]). State law specifies
a minimum duration for the penalty period associated with a sanction.
The sanction period for the first instance of noncompliance is 1 month
(or until the client complies, whichever is longer). The minimum du-
ration of a second sanction is 3 months, and subsequent sanctions last
for 6 months (New York Social Services Law, sec. 342 [2]). Suffolk
County DSS workers impose the sanction based on information provided
by the DOL and other work-related providers (e.g., the various SWEP
programs). Workers rely on state laws and regulations in imposing sanc-
tions. The local agency does not supplement these regulations with local
administrative directives.
State law permits use of sanctions only if violations are “without good
cause” (New York Social Services Law, sec. 342 [2] a). The statute ex-
plicitly provides that the good cause standard is met if the parent or
caretaker of a child can show that child care was unavailable for a child
under age 13 (sec. 342 [1]). Additional good cause exemptions are
provided. These include exemptions for clients who experience do-
mestic violence, physical limitations, and mental health limitations (sec.
341 [1] a), but the law allows departmental regulations to identify others
(sec. 342 [1]). The law also provides a conciliation process for resolving
sanctions and requires that failure to comply must be “willful” (sec. 341
[1] a).7
No state regulation further defines willful noncompliance, but the
regulations provide additional detail on what constitutes good cause
and how to determine it: “In determining whether or not good cause
exists, the social services official must consider the facts and circumstances,
including information submitted by the individual subject to such re-
quirements. Good cause includes circumstances beyond the individual’s control,
such as, but not limited to, illness of the member, illness of another house-
hold member requiring the presence of the member, a household emer-
gency, or the lack of adequate child care for children who have reached
age 6 but are under age 13” (18 New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations,
sec. 385.12 [2008]; emphasis added).
Thus, the regulation makes clear that determining good cause nec-
essarily involves discretion; the facts and circumstances of each case must
be considered. The regulation also explicitly permits an expansive in-
terpretation by clearly stating that good cause is not limited to the
provided examples.
New York State appellate courts have reiterated that the law requires
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that the violation be both without good cause and willful, finding on
several occasions that the local agency and the state agency (in its fair
hearing decisions) both failed to consider the issue of willfulness (Ben-
jamin v. McGowan, 712 N.Y.S.2d 546 [2000]; Earl v. Turner, 757 N.Y.S.2d
255 [2003]; Dost v. Wing, 792 N.Y.S.2d 105 [2005]).8 There are several
reasons why the requirement of willfulness makes it difficult for the
local agency to impose sanctions. First, the agency must verify whether
the client’s violation was willful before terminating benefits, and this
adds an additional level of inquiry (Benjamin v. McGowan, Earl v. Turner,
and Dost v. Wing). Second, willfulness and good cause are not equivalent;
the willfulness standard expands the range of circumstances in which
a sanction may not be imposed. For example, in Dost v. Wing, the court
found that forgetting an appointment is not a willful act. In that case,
the recipient confused the date of the appointment and contacted the
agency upon realizing the mistake.
Are Sanction Rules Applied Narrowly?
The law and regulations place good cause determinations at the heart
of the sanction process. Such determinations are necessarily fact specific
and discretionary. They involve assessing whether the client’s reason for
not complying is both true and sufficient. The most common good cause
explanation, both in the hearing and interview data, involves family and
situational obstacles, such as a client or child’s temporary illness, trans-
portation and day care problems, and other family emergencies. These
types of obstacles are raised as good cause explanations in 55 percent
of the hearing cases (70 out of 127) and by 53 percent of the clients
interviewed (15 of the 28). Scheduling conflicts with work or school are
cited by 20 percent of clients (26 clients) in the fair hearing data and
by 17 percent (5 clients) in the interview data. Thirteen (10 percent)
clients from the hearing data and five (18 percent) of the interviewed
clients claim that they never received notice of their appointment. Seven
fair hearing clients (5 percent) and two interviewed clients (7 percent)
claim that there was a clerical or other error by the agency. Eight fair
hearing clients (6 percent) and four interviewed clients (7 percent)
claim that they were exempt from the work rules.9
One way that workers and hearing officers limit the application of
good cause exemptions is to refuse to take clients’ explanations at face
value and to demand additional proof. This routinely occurs in the
hearing and interview data. In the hearing data, the hearing officer
(and, by extension, the worker) almost always rejects clients’ statements
and testimony as a source of proof.10 Clients won only 14 of 127 hearings,
and in only five hearings was a client’s testimony, standing alone, suf-
ficient to establish good cause. To be sure, legal proceedings are de-
signed to focus on proof as a means for ascertaining the truth. However,
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the demand for additional proof is not made because the client’s tes-
timony was inconsistent or contradicted by other evidence; this occurred
in only 17 out of 127 cases. In spite of this, third-party documentation
is routinely required, and clients are subjected to stiffer requirements
than may be required in the workplace.
Examples of this can be found in both the interview and the hearing
data. These situations often involve clients’ claims of their own or a
child’s illness. In the workplace, routine and temporary illnesses (e.g.,
stomach viruses or the flu) do not necessarily require medical verifi-
cation, but such verification is routinely required at the welfare center.
Verification requirements work against clients because proof is some-
times not available or not practical. An interviewee named Barbara ex-
plains.11 When she was unable to attend her SWEP assignment because
her son had an intestinal virus, the agency refused to accept her state-
ment and pressed her for a physician’s note, which she was unable to
obtain. Barbara recounts that the agency asked her, “Why didn’t you
take your baby, run to the doctor? And I said ’cause I didn’t have the
money to get there. And they was like, ‘Well you could have took the
bus.’ . . . I said no. I said, ‘He was sick; he had diarrhea, so I can’t go
on the bus . . . three buses.’”
Strict demands for documents also create problems for working clients
because such demands clash with the realities of their jobs. Rules stip-
ulate that clients must work a set number of hours per week and require
verification of wages. However, clients’ work hours often fluctuate, and
employers sometimes insist that new employees complete a trial period
in which they work a limited schedule with fewer than the mandated
number of hours. Employees are sometimes paid in cash, and some
employers are unwilling to provide verification of work hours.
Despite this, caseworkers refused to accept clients’ statements as em-
ployment verification when they worked off the books. Other forms of
proof are also rejected because they do not fit the bureaucratic mold.
For example, fair hearing data include the story of a client whose em-
ployer, a restaurant owner, refused to verify her employment. She un-
successfully tried to reverse her sanction by providing the hearing officer
with letters from two people who saw her working and with case notes
from the files of a local legal services attorney, who confirmed that the
employer would not verify employment.
Workers also routinely interpret ambiguous or incomplete proof in
the least favorable light. In a case from the fair hearing data, a client
claimed that she was too ill from her arthritis to attend a work assign-
ment. The progress notes that she produced from her physician at a
clinic were deemed insufficient because they only indicate that she
needed refills on her prescription and do not contain a detailed synopsis
of the flare-up of her illness. In another case from the fair hearing data,
a physician’s note documented the client’s bursitis, diabetic reticulo-
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pathy, and uncontrolled diabetes, but the note was rejected because it
did not mention the cold and influenza that caused her to miss her
work assignment. Although the client may have misinterpreted or ex-
aggerated her illness, an alternative explanation not considered by work-
ers is that short-staffed and busy medical clinics might not provide thor-
ough documentation.
In hearings, bureaucratic records, or the lack thereof, are routinely
accepted over clients’ statements, testimony, and even documentary
proof. The agency’s records are typically viewed as incontrovertible, and
little or no room is given to prove bureaucratic error. For example,
hearing officers consistently find that clients’ calls to workers did not
occur if the case record did not mention the call.12 In another example
from the hearing data, a client produced a time-stamped document
faxed to the agency, but the hearing officer ruled that it was not suf-
ficient proof that the agency received the client’s fax.
The requirement that the violation be willful is ignored in the fair
hearing data and interviews. Confusion and forgetfulness are routinely
interpreted as evasive behavior. A client named Katy describes the
agency’s response when she allegedly confused a DOL appointment
with a GED test date: “‘Can I get rescheduled? Am I gonna get in trouble
for this?’ They said, ‘Yes you are; you are gonna get in trouble.’ I’m
like, I have all the paperwork here. I can go right now and show I’ve
been looking for work, and I have the dates. I have this one; I have that
one; my resume is in here; my resume is in there; it’s not like I’m not
trying.”
The hearing data make an even more explicit case that confusion
and forgetfulness are not deemed to be valid reasons for missing ap-
pointments. Hearing officers routinely reject such explanations as in-
sufficient. In one illustrative example, the hearing officer acknowledged
the credibility of the client’s testimony that she forgot the appointment
but explained, “It does not constitute a valid reason, as appellant is
responsible for keeping track of her appointments.” In another case,
the client received two letters from the agency close in time. She as-
sumed (incorrectly) that the second letter was to notify her of a change
in the appointment. When she appeared on the second date and at the
wrong office, she was told that she could not be helped because she
missed her first appointment, and she was sanctioned. The hearing
officer upheld the sanction, noting that the “confusion over two ap-
pointments arose from her failure to safeguard agency correspondence.”
Similarly, unintentional acts are construed in negative ways. One il-
lustrative example involves a client who overslept on the day of a physical
examination that was required as part of her vocational training to
become a certified nursing assistant. Although she completed the phys-
ical examination 10 days later, she was sanctioned and not permitted
by the agency to complete the course. Upholding the agency’s action,
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the hearing officer explained that “the reason for the missed appoint-
ment, specifically that the appellant overslept, does not constitute good
cause.”
Clients’ miscommunications with workers and confusion over admin-
istrative procedures are also rejected as valid reasons for failing to com-
ply. In one example from the hearing data, a client believed he was not
required to report to the DOL for an employment assessment until his
physician completed a required medical assessment form. In another
example, a client did not report to the assigned work site because she
was not approved to receive a voucher for her child’s child care; she
mistakenly assumed that, because she received child care in the past, a
new application was not needed. In both cases, the hearing officers
rejected these explanations, noting that the clients had been properly
notified of their obligation to report.
In sum, although clients may not have reported honestly to their
workers or in hearings, it is also the case that common mistakes, con-
fusion, and unintentional acts are interpreted with suspicion and dis-
trust. Some legal requirements, such as that the violation be willful, are
ignored. Other legal provisions, specifically good cause exemptions, are
construed narrowly. The latter is accomplished by privileging agency
records over clients’ accounts, imposing strict standards of proof, rou-
tinely requiring third-party documentation, and parsing documents in
ways detrimental to the client.
Are Sanctions Applied in a Manner That Subverts Policy Goals?
The goal of sanctions is to ensure client compliance with work rules.
The goal of work rules is to help clients achieve self-sufficiency. However,
the data suggest that a narrow focus on rules and procedural compliance
undermines these goals. Procedural violations are elevated over sub-
stantive outcomes, such that the reporting of work-related events takes
on more significance than the event itself. As a consequence, sanctions
are imposed even if clients are engaged in ongoing work activities.
The reporting rules are specified in documents provided to all clients.
These rules require clients to attend work assignments, DOL appoint-
ments, and other activities. In addition, clients are required to notify
designated agencies of certain events or problems. For example, clients
are required to sign a form in which they agree to contact the DOL if
they are terminated from a SWEP assignment. They are also required
to notify the DOL in advance if they cannot attend an appointment.
The reporting responsibilities invite workers to avoid complex as-
sessments of clients’ willingness to work and instead to ask the much
simpler question of whether the proper parties were notified of a missed
activity. For example, interview data indicate that several clients abruptly
moved to new shelters, some as far as 50 miles away, and were unable
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to attend their SWEP assignments because they lacked transportation.
They were sanctioned for not notifying the DOL of the transportation
problem. One client explained that the agency moved her to a new
shelter, and she therefore assumed (incorrectly) that only her work site
supervisor needed to be notified. The agency, however, viewed her fail-
ure to notify the DOL as a clear violation of the reporting requirement,
and this determination was made despite the fact that the client had a
valid reason for not attending.
In another example from the interview data, the agency is reported
to have viewed the client’s underlying reason for not attending a DOL
appointment as less important than whether and to whom she reported
it. Jessica, who was pursuing a medical assistant’s certificate on her own
while attending her SWEP assignment, had a scheduling conflict when
her monthly DOL appointment was to take place at the same time as
an important test. She chose to take the test, but the DOL had no
record that she notified it (a point of contention). She was sanctioned
despite her ongoing attendance at the work site and proof from her
school of the test date.
Work rules that require a set number of weekly work hours have the
anomalous effect of obscuring clients’ work efforts. As noted above, the
uneven availability of hours that often characterizes low-wage work cre-
ates compliance problems for clients. As the fair hearing and interview
data reveal, employers may at first employ workers at reduced hours
and increase hours over time. Further, home health aide assignments
may be canceled, or restaurant hours may fluctuate, leaving clients some-
times short of the hours required. Rather than viewing such circum-
stances as outside the clients’ control, and hence as good cause for not
fully complying with work rules, hearing officers adhere strictly to the
rules, upholding sanctions if clients fall a few hours short. The work
mandate’s overall goal, employment, is overlooked or not considered.
In one such case, the client was sanctioned when she left her SWEP
assignment on a Tuesday to begin a full-time job on the following Sun-
day. The hearing officer upheld the sanction, noting that the client
should have continued in her SWEP assignment until the first day of
her new job. That she had secured employment was less relevant than
the hours she missed in her transition from SWEP to work.
In sum, a technical, narrow, and often reductive application of the
rules obscures clients’ work efforts. To be sure, the rules themselves,
including rules that require clients to work a certain number of hours
per week, direct a certain result. However, rules defining good cause
and requiring willfulness permit variation in determining sanctions for
individual cases. The choice of rigidity over flexibility when both are
possible is characteristic of eligibility-compliance cultures.
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Are Heterogeneous Groups of Clients Sanctioned?
Another mark of an eligibility-compliance culture is a lack of individ-
ualized attention to and differentiation among clients (Kane and Bane
1994; Brodkin 1997). Under such a regime, sanctioned clients would
likely be diverse, and different types of clients would be caught up in
a bureaucratized sanctioning process that treated most, if not all, clients
with suspicion and skepticism.
As the interview data reveal (the fair hearing data do not include
demographic data), sanction recipients are a diverse mix of short- and
long-term clients who have varying levels of work history and education.
Two groups of clients emerge: short-term clients who are job ready and
willing to work and long-term clients with multiple disadvantages. Con-
trary to expectations, both types of clients are sanctioned, and there is
no discernible distinction between the two. Ann and Carol exemplify
this heterogeneity. They have very different backgrounds, routes to wel-
fare, and motivations toward work, but they share similar sanction his-
tories.
Carol, 38 years old, has a long work history that began when she was
16 and continues through the births of her five children. As she says
in describing her return to work just 2 weeks after her youngest child’s
birth, “I never saw her take her first steps. . . . It was what I had to do
to take care of her. To survive, that’s what you had to do.” She worked
as a paralegal for over a decade but lost her job when her employer
closed his law office. Because she lacks the required college degree, she
could not find employment as a paralegal. Unable to pay the rent, she
became homeless. She first applied for welfare at age 37. At the time
of the interview, she had been on public assistance for a little over a
year. She had a clear plan for leaving welfare; she was pursuing a college
degree in adolescent psychology and, to comply with the work rules,
was also working as a hostess in a catering company. She was sanctioned
several times for failing to attend DOL appointments, which often con-
flicted with her other obligations.
In contrast, Ann applied for welfare as a teenager and, by age 22,
had been on assistance for 4 years. She has three children and is preg-
nant with her fourth. A high school dropout, she earned her GED and
became a certified nursing assistant while on public assistance. Despite
earning $14.50 an hour as a nursing assistant, she resists more than
part-time work and cuts her work hours to remain eligible for welfare.
Ann repeatedly fails to attend her work assignment, claiming she is
stymied by red tape, such as by problems in obtaining the correct form
for a child care referral or by miscommunications with the work site.
Carol and Ann are representative of other clients interviewed. One
group, composed typically of short-term or transitory welfare users like
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Carol, works around the work rules, pursuing educational or work op-
portunities independently. Interview data suggest that their sense of self-
efficacy is high and that they have concrete plans. For example, Jessica,
a 33-year-old mother with three children, was on assistance for 1 year
and has an extensive work history. She pursues her own plan to increase
her earning potential by obtaining a medical assistant’s certificate. Be-
cause the certificate program does not satisfy the work rules, she also
has a SWEP assignment to work at a local social service agency. She
made an arrangement with her social service agency supervisor to attend
her assignment after school, putting in a day that starts early in the
morning and ends at 9:00 at night. She was sanctioned when she missed
a routine DOL appointment because it conflicted with a test at school.
Another group of clients includes long-term users who have multiple
barriers to work. These clients resist their work assignments, are often
in crisis, and find compliance difficult. For example, Gladys, a 28-year-
old mother with three children, was on welfare for 6 years and dropped
out of school in the tenth grade. She refused a work assignment, ex-
plaining, “I don’t see myself getting up early in the morning to go down
there for all them hours, 35 a week, while everybody gets a paycheck
and not me. That doesn’t make sense.” She was sanctioned repeatedly
and claims that various barriers prevent her from complying. She de-
scribed herself as “used to the sanction.”
Despite their obvious differences, these short- and long-term clients
have similar sanction histories. Missed appointments at the DOL and
the failure to attend SWEP assignment are the most common reasons.
The heterogeneity of the clients suggests that workers bureaucratize
sanctions, applying them without distinguishing among the types of
violations or levels of client work efforts.
Limitations
This study, like much implementation research, is limited to the sites
being studied. This is an especially important limitation in a study of
welfare because states have great flexibility in program design and ad-
ministration. New York is unlike many states in that it imposes only
partial sanctions. Workers in the state may apply sanctions differently
than do workers with access to the harsher full sanctions. Also, Suffolk
is a suburban county; the findings may not be applicable to rural coun-
ties with less complex bureaucracies or to larger and more complex
bureaucracies located in urban areas.
This study is limited to examining exercises of negative discretion.
Positive discretion is difficult to capture. It occurs in cases where workers
have a basis to impose a sanction (e.g., a missed work activity) but do
not. Such acts do not generate formal notices or appeals and are not
likely to be represented in administrative records. Clients are not nec-
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essarily aware of instances in which workers chose not to sanction them.
To be sure, the forms of negative discretion described herein, and their
application to a heterogeneous group of clients, suggest a particular
type of culture often identified with welfare bureaucracies and, hence,
are likely not exceptional. Although this study is useful in establishing
the forms that negative discretion can take, further studies are needed.
Further research may benefit from a different methodological approach
that focuses on the use of positive discretion in sanctioning.
The study’s findings on the heterogeneity of the sanctioned popu-
lation are also limited. As noted above, the findings are based solely on
the interview data. Although clients were recruited from diverse sources,
the sample size is small. This sample differs from those in other studies,
noted above, which indicate that the likelihood of receiving a sanction
increases with the client’s level of disadvantage. Such heterogeneity may
be a result of the way sanctions are applied in Suffolk County, and it
may be difficult to generalize findings from studies of individual sites.
Further research is needed to determine how sanctions affect different
subpopulations of welfare recipients.
Discussion and Implications
The shift in emphasis from cash assistance to work programs raises the
potential for fundamental change in the culture of welfare agencies.
Kane and Bane (1994) reject an emphasis on eligibility verification and
compliance, instead advocating creation of a self-sufficiency culture in
which “clients and workers [would engage] in the common tasks of
finding work, arranging child care, and so on” (2). However, Mead
(1997, 24) aptly describes welfare reform as a mix of “help and hassle.”
It mixes the potential to help clients with the ability to punish them.
New York’s statutory and regulatory framework reflects this dichot-
omy. Although it requires sanctions, it also leaves ample room for in-
dividualizing them. The regulatory language allows for an expansive
interpretation of good cause provisions, and the statutory requirements
that violations be willful give workers considerable leeway. Discretion,
though, can be exercised negatively or positively. As Richard Fording
and colleagues (2007, 291) observe, “Discretion may serve as an entry
point for unjust and unequal treatment or, alternatively, may permit the
tailoring of more equitable and humane responses.”
This study’s findings identify the forms that negative discretion can
take. Both workers and hearing officers hew to a narrow interpretation
of good cause while also making that standard difficult to meet. An
ingrained skepticism of clients’ explanations leads workers and hearing
officers to dismiss clients’ proof and to see intentionality where others
might recognize forgetfulness or confusion. Sanctions are not individ-
ualized but applied broadly. In doing so, workers use bureaucratic short-
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cuts that avoid a full assessment of clients’ work efforts. Process is exalted
over substance, catching a diverse group of clients in the net of sanctions.
In sum, workers replicate the eligibility-compliance style of the past and
impose the harsh service technologies typically reserved for low-status
clients.
There are several possible explanations for the patterns described
here. One lies in the enormity of the task of welfare agencies. Helping
clients achieve self-sufficiency is difficult; economic conditions and hu-
man capital are equally relevant, if not more so, than welfare center
practices (Fang and Keane 2004). The hardships endured by the welfare
poor, including high rates of illness and disease, poor housing, inade-
quate educational systems, and the lack of everyday supports that facil-
itate work, are well documented (see, e.g., Rank 1994; Edin and Lein
1997; Seccombe 2007). Accordingly, an agency focus on documents and
procedural violations, the hallmark of an eligibility-compliance culture,
is less complicated than a focus on helping clients obtain self-sufficiency.
Rather than helping clients to access support services, or acting after
supports fail, sanctions can be used to assign blame and to absolve the
worker of any responsibility for a client’s failure to achieve self-suffi-
ciency.
On an organizational level, the location of employment services at
the DOL instead of the DSS may affect how workers exercise their dis-
cretion. As Irene Lurie and Norma Riccucci (2003, 674) explain, “Where
responsibility for work activities was transferred to a specialized agency,
there was little need for the welfare agency to become, in Moynihan’s
words, an employment and training program that provided income sup-
port. Workers in the welfare agency could continue to focus primarily
on cash assistance, food stamps, and Medicaid, paying considerable at-
tention to eligibility and compliance.” Sanctions become an eligibility
task, performed the same way as other eligibility tasks. Process prevails
over substance, and standardization over individual assessments.
Despite its emphasis on support services and organizational flexibility,
welfare reform may result in less change than is commonly assumed.
As Brodkin (1997) observes, workers’ choices about whether to apply
rules strictly or generously are shaped by agency incentives and pro-
cedures. Welfare reform includes such incentives as work participation
rates, mandated weekly work hours, and restricted definitions of work
activities. These incentives encourage workers to routinize their work.
The work-first approach, which calls for immediate labor market at-
tachment, encourages depersonalized service (Anderson 2001). Virtu-
ally all of the clients interviewed are engaged in the same trajectory of
work activities, from routine DOL appointments to job search activities,
to approved jobs, to SWEP assignments. This similarity invites the stan-
dardization and bureaucratization of sanctions. It encourages workers
to judge the part, not the whole; a missed DOL meeting is a missed
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meeting, regardless of the other work activities of the client. Likewise,
if judged by the single standard of a missed meeting, a short-term, job-
ready client is no different than a long-term disadvantaged client.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, workers may be doing what is
expected of them, both by the welfare organization and by the policy
makers responsible for the bureaucratic structure. As Michael Lipsky
(1984) recognized decades ago, there are many ways to disentitle citi-
zens. One way is through legislative schemes that reduce benefits; an-
other is through “bureaucratic disentitlement,” or the denial of aid to
eligible people through “largely obscure ‘bureaucratic’ actions and in-
actions of public authorities” (Lipsky 1984, 3). Lipsky suggests that bu-
reaucratic disentitlement is likely to occur in the absence of legislative
change as a way to resolve often hidden societal conflicts concerning
the distribution of benefits.
However, disentitlement can also occur in tandem with legislative
change and can resolve conflicts within the law. One potential conflict
is welfare reform’s simultaneous injunctions to help clients with an un-
precedented array of supports and also to sanction them. Conflict arises
if law and regulations leave unclear which, support or sanction, is ap-
propriate. Likewise, the statutory scheme reinforces and amplifies neg-
ative tendencies to view welfare clients homogeneously as unwilling to
work, even as the scheme requires individualized and complex judg-
ments of whether work rules violations are willful and without good
cause. Thus, although the 1996 welfare reform legislation is aptly de-
scribed as a punitive and harsh, it also incorporates values of equity and
fairness. Courts may uphold provisions designed to ensure fairness (as
one did in requiring a New York agency to determine willfulness), but
the welfare bureaucracy, both past and present, is highly attuned to the
harsh and punitive features of the system. In narrowly interpreting good
cause, and even in ignoring the law regarding willfulness, the bureauc-
racy expands by administrative means welfare reform’s harshest provi-
sions.
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1. The Office of Hearings and Appeals, a component of the New York State Office of
Temporary and Disability Assistance (NYOTDA), has supervisory responsibility over all
hearings in the state. The state is divided by regions, consisting of several counties, and
hearing officers are assigned to particular counties within these regions. The NYOTDA
state commissioner’s designee for each region makes the final decision on individual cases.
This decision is based on the hearing officer’s findings of fact and law, as well as on the
officer’s recommendations. Because the hearing system is partially decentralized, hearing
outcomes may vary and therefore are more representative of the practices of a particular
region or county than of those across the entire state.
2. Appeal rates for financial assistance programs are between 1.1 and 3.5 percent in
New York State, outside of New York City (Lens and Vorsanger 2005). Although appeal
rates are low outside the city, the rates are higher than the sample size used to assess error
rates under quality control (1.5–2 percent according to Wrafter [1984]). In any event,
the available administrative data do not permit me to estimate what portion of appeals
are related to sanctions, but findings from a recent study (Brandwein et al. 2000) suggest
that it may be unusually high. The study, based on surveys of 174 current or former welfare
recipients who sought assistance at nonprofit agencies in Suffolk County, finds that almost
one-third, or 51 recipients, were sanctioned at some point, and 38 (74 percent) of those
sanctioned appealed the sanction by requesting a hearing (Brandwein et al. 2000). Al-
though the study’s results are biased by the failure of some recipients to complete the
survey (and hence perhaps also the likely failure to appeal), the results still demonstrate
an unusually high rate of appeal. In the current study, interviews with the sample of clients
also indicate that participants appealed at high rates. Of the 28 clients interviewed, 14
(50 percent) report that they appealed a sanction. The sampling was designed to distin-
guish clients who appealed from those who did not, and the former were surprisingly easy
to identify across the range of referral sources used to recruit participants for interviews.
3. As Hyman and colleagues (1992) explain in their study of the complaint behavior
of residential utility customers, if organizational and environmental barriers inhibit com-
plaints, “the universe of problems perceived, voiced, and complained will be successively
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smaller than the universe of problems experienced by consumers” (100). The complaints
are more likely to be the tip of the iceberg than to be aberrations.
4. Clients were recruited as part of a larger study that focuses on sanctions. The study
examines what motivates clients to use the fair hearing system or impedes them from
using it. Thus, purposive sampling is used to identify sanctioned clients who had, or had
not, used the fair hearing system.
5. Because sampling was not random, the interview sample may not be representative
of the general sanction population in Suffolk County. The only available demographic
information on the county’s sanction population comes from a study conducted jointly
in 2003 by Suffolk County DSS and the Education and Assistance Corporation (EAC), a
nonprofit agency that provides services to sanctioned clients under an agreement with
DSS (Suffolk County Department of Social Services 2003). The study was based on data
from the 489 sanctioned clients who were referred by DSS to EAC for assessment and
services in 2002. Clients are referred to EAC if they fail to come into compliance after
being sanctioned. Thus, the study does not include all sanctioned clients. It focuses on a
subpopulation of sanctioned clients that may or may not be more disadvantaged than the
overall sanctioned population. Although sanctions may not compel some clients to comply
because they have other sources of income and are willing to accept a grant reduction,
others may be unable to comply because of multiple barriers. In any event, the sample
in this study differs from the sample in the sanction study. The primary differences relate
to the level of education. The current study sample reports higher education levels than
those reported by the Suffolk County study population (Suffolk County Department of
Social Services 2003). In the current study, 54 percent report that they have a high school
diploma or GED; the rate was 34 percent in the Suffolk County study. Overall, 42 percent
of the current study’s sample is black, 46 percent is white, and 14 percent is Hispanic. In
the Suffolk County study, 50 percent were black, 28 percent were white, 17 percent were
Hispanic, and 5 percent identified themselves as members of some other group. The
average age of the current sample is 35; it was 32 in the Suffolk County study.
6. Administrative hearing decisions are reviewable by the state courts through a pro-
ceeding filed under article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The standard
of review is whether the decision is based on substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion (New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, sec. 7803).
7. The purpose of conciliations is to provide clients with an additional opportunity to
present their reasons for noncompliance before their grant is reduced. The local agency
is required to offer conciliations, but participation is voluntary and does not affect a client’s
right to request a fair hearing.
8. That the failure to consider the issue of willfulness, despite a statutory mandate, was
widespread seems to be indicated by a General Information System (GIS) notice sent in
September, 2005, by the NYOTDA (2005) to all welfare districts. It advised districts that,
in accordance with the court decisions in Earl v. Turner and Dost v. Wing, they must revise
their sanction procedures to include a determination of willfulness. The GIS notice em-
phasized that such determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis and should include
“identifying a pattern of the recipient’s failure to take reasonable steps to address issues
within the recipient’s control that may prevent the recipient from complying with em-
ployment requirements” (NYOTDA 2005, 1).
9. In the results presented for noncompliance among the interviewed clients, the sum
of the percentages exceeds 100 because several clients had multiple sanctions and there-
fore provided multiple reasons for noncompliance.
10. The evidence submitted at the hearing is sometimes, but not always, different than
the evidence submitted to the agency when the sanction is first imposed. The agency has
the option of withdrawing the sanction upon examining the client’s evidence at the
hearing. No statistics are available on the frequency with which the agency exercises this
option in sanction cases, but the agency withdraws its notice in about one-third of all
hearing cases in Suffolk County. Both through the initial imposition of the sanction and
by not withdrawing, the agency rejects the client’s proof. Thus, for the purpose of this
analysis, the hearing officer’s and the agency’s standards of proof are viewed as inter-
changeable if the sanction is upheld.
11. To protect the confidentiality of the participants, all names in this article are pseu-
donyms.
12. The hearing officer found otherwise in only one observed case. In that case, the
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recipient submitted personal telephone records indicating that she placed a call to the
DOL and further evidence that not all phone calls from clients to the DOL were logged
in case records.
